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We know prosecutors take advantage of overcriminalization. Yet we also
know they do much to mitigate it. So much, in fact, that they largely keep
overcriminalization from becoming a salient political problem that could generate
a political response such as code revision. If every law were enforced vigorously,
there would be public backlash. But the outrageous laws largely lie in desuetude,
for familiar reasons.1 To be sure, this is not always true, and that's why some
overcriminalization-of particular sorts, meaning overlapping or redundant crimes
and excessive punishment-are still problems that occur randomly and
periodically. (How much each sort is a problem is both hard to detect and, because
it is a normative call, hard to judge.) Much of overcriminalization's effect is low
visibility; it occurs at the level of plea bargaining as in Bordenkircher v. Hayes 2:
prosecutors use overlapping or excessive statutes to force plea bargains. But while
there is a problem that needs a remedy, there is also evidence of substantial
constraint in prosecutor practice.
I want to venture an additional explanation-on top of more familiar ones-
for why prosecutors exercise some restraint in charging and generally exploiting
overcriminalization. Then, I want to suggest a different route to addressing what I
think is the key aspect of overcriminalization that prosecutors exploit, which is not
criminalization of innocent or marginally wrongful conduct but redundant
criminalization of clearly wrongful activity.
1.
Criminal law is overwhelmingly state law, and its administration is a
significant public policy endeavor for states, which means the insights of
competitive federalism could provide some insights on criminal law policy's
evolution. On a stylized set of assumptions, 3 the theory of competitive federalism
* Professor and David H. Ibbeken Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583 (2005) (describing how local
politics and budget constraints keep state prosecutors focused on priority crimes).
2 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
3 For a description of those assumptions, see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery,
The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best
World, 86 GEO. L. J. 201, 208-09 (1997). For an argument that those assumptions often do not hold
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posits, in brief, that jurisdictions compete with each other to produce various
public goods, including regulation (such as environmental law) and public
services, at optimal levels, because they compete with each other to attract
residents and industry. States whose policies generate an appealing regulatory
environment should attract employers, and those whose policies generate good
quality of life through provision of public services, benefits, and regulations should
attract residents. States that lose in this competition should be forced, by this
market pressure among jurisdictions, to improve their policies.
Of course, things can be more complicated than this initial picture suggests.
Some of these goals may conflict. The regulatory environment that businesses
seek may not provide the benefits that residents seek. Jurisdictional competition
literature is filled with debates about races-to-the-top versus races-to-the-bottom.
In the competition on environmental regulation, for instance, states may reduce
regulatory obligations to attract industry at a cost of reduced quality of life
(including, e.g., air and water purity or landscape integrity) for residents.
Environmental law is one contest in which commentators have argued state
competition produced a race for the bottom that needed to be solved by federal
regulation that supersedes the regulatory outcomes of state competition.4
Despite its complications, the jurisdictional competition thesis might seem an
appealing explanatory theory for contemporary criminal justice policies generally
and an important influence on prosecutors in particular. Criminal law is an
important regulatory and policy endeavor for states seeking to improve and
maintain an attractive environment and quality of life for residents and businesses.
Holding aside retribution goals, criminal law's dominant public purpose is to
improve public safety and welfare by reducing crime. State criminal justice
policies could be in competition with each other and, if approaches vary, over time
some should prove more successful than others. Successful jurisdictions would
enjoy lower crime rates and better quality of life, which could affect other
jurisdictions, especially neighboring jurisdictions, at least two ways. The
successful state would attract more residents who seek a lower-crime environment,
and criminals would migrate from the state in reaction to successful crime
prevention policies (and be deterred from migrating to it in the first place).
Sometimes, offenders might set up residence in other states, especially nearby
ones; sometimes they may forgo criminal activity altogether. Other states would
adopt successful policies initiated by early, innovative states. The pattern of some
criminal justice policies sweeping across a large majority of states-recidivist
in analyses of legal federalism and thus the model's argument for the virtues of jurisdictional
competition is weak, see id. at 222.
4 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race
to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). For
a challenge to the argument about the "race to the bottom" from state competition over environmental
policy, see Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis,
115 HARV. L. REv. 553 (2001).
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sentencing statutes, sex offender registration, 5 and preventive detention, for three
examples-might be seen to fit this model.
At first blush, it seems jurisdictional competition could be a major force in
driving state actors, legislators, judges, and prosecutors, toward harsher criminal
justice policies. They want to drive criminal activity to neighboring states
(assuming some actors cannot be deterred altogether), and prevent neighbors from
driving crime into their jurisdictions. They want their voters to enjoy lower crime
and better quality of life and to reap the benefits of jurisdictional competition that
come from those results. The trend toward much harsher sentencing policies in the
last thirty years, which prosecutors are key actors in implementing, can be viewed
as a product of this process: states concluded harsh sentencing policies were
successful elsewhere, and they feared being a lower-sentence jurisdiction to whom
harsh-sentencing states might push their criminals. The competitive dynamic set
up a cycle of states competing with each for ever-harsher criminalization,
enforcement, and punishment policies, which seems to have leveled off-after
exceeding the incarceration rates of all other democracies--only due to the
substantial strain that high incarceration rates put on state budgets.
6
We certainly see some of that competitive dynamic in criminal justice
contexts beyond sentencing policy. Overall, states criminalize more than they
decriminalize. Doron Teichman recently offered an extended argument to this
effect, suggesting local jurisdictions pursue harsh criminal justice policies to
displace crime into neighboring jurisdictions.7 He suggests the problem is
sufficiently significant that federal criminal law may be a useful tool for reforming
the dysfunctional competitive market for criminal justice. His examples, however,
are relatively few, because the thesis applies mostly to profit-driven crimes and to
offenders who are willing to relocate to continue crime or avoid sanctions. So, for
example, Teichman offers good evidence that organized car theft rings seem to
have clearly been affected to shift jurisdictions by concerted state efforts to prevent
and prosecute car thefts. Some larger-scale drug rings, such as those focused on
methamphetamine production, may respond similarly. And at least anecdotal
evidence suggests sex offenders sometimes respond to onerous registration
requirements and residency restrictions intended to encourage them to leave
jurisdictions.
Yet much crime, including crimes of opportunity and passion, are unlikely to
fit this jurisdictional competition model. The model seems even weaker with
respect to law-abiding residents seeking out locales with successful crime-
5 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003) (noting that by 1996, all fifty states and D.C. had
enacted sex offender registration laws).
6 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1713,
1721 (2006); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLuM. L. REv.
1276 (2005) [hereinafter Politics of Sentencing].
7 Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1831 (2005).
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reduction strategies. To note only one set of problems, jurisdictions produce many
sets of public goods or policies, and potential residents must choose the entire set
of policies when they choose a given jurisdiction. Put differently, jurisdictions can
fashion a range of different sets of policies (criminal justice, environmental, public
transportation, health care, tax levels, etc.), and citizens choose among these
packages. But as the number of policies multiplies, the number of jurisdictions
with different combinations must increase in order for each citizen to have an
option to choose an optimal package. In the real world, an optimal mix may not be
available to many, so competitive pressure may do more to shape some policies
than others. And all this holds aside real-world restrictions on citizens' mobility
among jurisdictions, such as limited employment possibilities or family ties.
Regardless of whether the jurisdictional competition model is weak outside a
specific set of crimes and offenders, or whether other factors overcome the
incentives that the model posits, the interesting developments are the notable
exceptions to this trend and to the presumed pressure of jurisdictional competition.
I want to highlight one set of variations of states in criminal justice policy and one
explanation for them that has gotten little attention. The variations are in
sentencing trends, and the explanation arises from differences in state democratic
processes, political cultures, and measures of civic engagement.
II.
Dan Richman and Bill Stuntz's influential explanations for criminal law
politics 8 and prosecutor regulation 9 suggest that election of local prosecutors,
combined with those prosecutors' identifiable responsibilities for local crime, keep
those prosecutors focused on crimes that citizens care about most-violent crime,
theft and property crime, and drug crime-and constrain them from spending much
effort on other sorts of conduct criminalized in expansive codes. Those codes,
though, show little prospect of contracting, because legislators can create new
crimes cheaply and take little political heat for enforcement actions that prove
unpopular. On this picture, codes, like sentencing policy, are likely to expand but
not contract; prosecutors are likely to be vigorous enforcers of core crimes-
salient crimes that affect quality of life. Yet these accounts paint with a broad
brush, with little attention to variations among states. There are substantial
variations, however, that suggest the likelihood of variation in other aspects of
criminal justice administration, including prosecutors' broad range of discretionary
actions on charging, bargaining and sentencing. That variation is most easily
documented in sentencing policy, and it suggests that influences other than
jurisdictional competition have a dominant effect on prosecutorial discretion and
criminal justice policy more generally.
8 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505
(2001).
9 See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 1.
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Consider state incarceration rates. In 1998,10 the overall incarceration rate in
state prisons averaged 433 per 100,000 population. That average has steadily and
dramatically increased over the last three decades, in accord with well known
changes in sentencing policy. But that average masks wide variation among states.
Per 100,000 population, individual state's incarceration rates range from 117 to
743. To highlight some comparisons, Connecticut's rate is 537, while neighboring
Massachusetts' is 292. North Dakota's is 144 per 100,000, but South Dakota's is
more than double that-328. South Carolina's is 573, while Tennessee's is 325
and North Carolina's is 420. Arizona's rate stands at 525; next door, New
Mexico's is barely half that at only 286. Delaware is high above the average at
743; Rhode Island is well below it at 348. All states' rates increased in recent
decades, but some increased at rates much greater than others. Jurisdictional
competition seems to offer little explanatory power here. What accounts for the
variation?
Familiar explanations include variations in crime rates and in social factors
such as racial demographics and economic marginality or employment conditions.
Recently, Bill Stuntz has also stressed a correlation between policing and prison:
the more police a jurisdiction has, the lower its incarceration rate tends to be. To
these explanations, criminologist Vanessa Barker has recently added an innovative
account of variations in states' political contexts, democratic processes, and
governance strategies that suggests how state officials and citizens can choose to
respond very differently to similar trends in crime problems. 12
In brief, Barker closely studied a small set of states as case studies, selected
because they represent different approaches to state governing structures and
democratic processes. Building on existing literature, Barker characterizes state
governments by both their rates of civic engagement and their degree of
governmental centralization or state activism; these parameters yield three broad
types of state political structures: populist, pragmatic, and participatory democracy.
The centralization parameter focuses on formal government structures, such as
legislative organization and use of popular referenda. The civic engagement data
comes in part from data on differing voter participation rates and, interestingly,
10 For convenience initially, I use figures from BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998, tbl. 5.4. For more recent data showing comparable
contrasts, see WILLAM J. SABOL, TODD D. MINTON AND PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
BULL., PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006 (2007).
11 See William J. Stuntz, Accountable Policing, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 130,
Soc. Sc. RES. NETWORK, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886170 (last modified July 5, 2006).
12 Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Punishing: Building a State Governance Theory of
American Imprisonment Variation, 8 PUNISHMENT & Soc. 5 (2006) [hereinafter Barker, Governance
Theory]; Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Punishing: A Comparative Historical Analysis of American
Democracy and Punishment Variation, 1965-Present (unpublished doctoral dissertation).
Barker's four types of state political structures or types of governance are populist,
participatory democracy, pragmatism, and patronage-oriented. See Barker, Governance Theory,
supra at 10 & tbl.1.
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levels of civic engagement as measured by sociologist Robert Putnam's social
capital index.' 3  In the interest of brevity, I will highlight two of Barker's
contrasting examples, selected because both faced similar rising crime rates
starting in the 1960s, though their different governing practices seem to account
for much of the difference in their responses to those challenges.
California has above-average incarceration rates and below-average voter-
participation rates and indicia of social capital, combined with a populist
governance form that tends to encourage conflict among social groups rather than
participatory civic involvement. California's series of harsh sentencing policies
since the 1960s, enacted by the legislature as well as by popular initiative,
represent responses "tied to the insecurities and concerns of 'the people' rather
than to the dispassionate treatment models espoused by the state's technocrats and
criminological experts"'14 or the more moderate policy options generated in more
participatory forms of governance.
By contrast, Washington is a state with a stronger tradition of participatory
democracy including wide involvement in town hall-style meetings, hybrid citizen-
state councils, and civic associations. In contrast to California, its voter
participation rate and social capital rank are well above average. Perhaps as a
consequence, its incarceration rate is well below average, even though it faced
similar circumstances of rising crime starting in the 1960s. Washington explored a
range of criminal justice policy options in a deliberate process of town hall
meetings and public hearings that eventually resulted in the state's sentencing
guidelines in 1983, combined with a sentencing commission charged with
exploring alternatives to incarceration. Other state policies turned to situational
crime control techniques (street lighting and the like) rather than additional
punitive strategies. 15
Washington's more recent three-strikes legislation is more narrowly drawn
than California's and has not dramatically pushed up the prison population.'
6
Barker credits the state's participatory governance structures and deliberative
process that relies on wide civic engagement for moderate outcomes in punishment
policy. More broadly, she concludes, surprisingly, that "American states with
widespread citizen participation tend to keep imprisonment relatively low even in
the face of high crime."' 7 If this is so, it undermines the jurisdictional competition
model as an explanation for harsh criminal justice policies. On the other hand, it is
13 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REvIvAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000). Putnam defines social capital as "social networks that tend to bring about
increased reciprocity and trust among individuals," Barker, Governance Theory, supra note 12, at 8,
and using a large database he ranks states by rates of civic engagement and social capital.
14 Barker, Governance Theory, supra note 12, at 14.
"5 See id. at 16-19.
16 Id. at 17-19.
17 Id. at 6.
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consistent with the thesis familiar among legal scholars that institutional design
affects substantive policy outcomes.
As a modest test and extension of part of Barker's thesis, I cross-referenced
data from Putnam's social capital index, in which he ranks state populations by
their rates of civic engagement, with recent data on state incarceration rates. 8 The
results are notable. As the map19 below illustrates, states with below-median rates
of civic engagement (regardless of state governance structure) overwhelmingly
have above-median incarceration rates. Conversely, states with high civic-
engagement rates predominantly have below-average percentages of their citizens
in prison. More specifically, 16 of 24 states that rank below the median on the
social capital index also have above-average incarceration rates; three of the
remaining 24 states have prison rates right at the mean. On the other hand, 18 of
22 states that have above-mean social capital measurements also have below-
average incarceration rates. (One state, Delaware, ranks exactly on the social-
capital mean and has an above-average prison rate.)
MZ
7---- -7 ____ ---- --
.. .. . . .. --- -- .
M2
MWE
Is See PuTNAM, supra note 13, at 19 (defining defines "social capital" as social networks that
tend to bring about increased reciprocity and trust among individuals).
'9 Putnam did not generate social-capital data for Alaska and Hawaii, so those states are not
included here.
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Incarceration rates are in large part functions of legislative and gubernatorial
policy making. But prosecutors play a role as well, and these variations in social
and political culture-and to a lesser degree in governance structure-seem likely
candidates for also having some influence on prosecutors' decision making (as
well as on legislatures' decisions on criminal justice issues other than sentencing,
such as crime creation). To explore the connection further between local political
cultures and prosecutor behavior, one would need data on variations in the political
structure of prosecutors' political accountability. A large majority of states use
similar systems of direct, quadrennial election of head prosecutors by local
jurisdictions. But how prosecutors are influenced by other actors and structures,
such as local courts, sentencing guidelines, and local political culture, likely varies
much more, as does the nature of prosecutors' political interaction with local
constituencies. I have not yet gathered that data and am not aware of other work
on this topic. Yet, from existing broad-level descriptions of state prosecutors'
responsiveness to local political preferences, 20 from studies of state-level
differences in monitoring effects of sentencing commissions and legislatures, 2' and
from more detailed accounts of wide variation in prosecutors' approaches to a
range of important policy choices, including plea bargaining practices, open
discovery, drug court participation, the role of variations in democratic structures
and local political practices seems a promising avenue for explanatory accounts of
prosecutorial discretion in criminal justice policymaking. Moreover, crime rates
can vary significantly from city to city within states, a fact that that both likely
affects and is affected by prosecutorial discretion.23 The design of democratic
practices, in conjunction with varying patterns of civic life, hold the prospect for
more descriptive power about criminal justice policy than the pressures of
jurisdictional competition, or than more familiar explanations such as rising crime
rates or a social consensus for harsh retributivism.
20 Richman & Stuntz, supra note 1.
21 For an analysis of how state judges in Virginia are monitored by the legislature that
reappoints them through data gathered by the state sentencing commission, see Nancy King &
Roosevelt Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REv. 885
(2004). If such monitoring disciplines judges' discretionary sentencing choices, it seems likely to at
least indirectly affect as well the prosecutors who work within the sentencing constraints that judges
abide by.
22 For a major study of a ground-level courthouse relations among prosecutors and other local
actors in criminal justice systems, documenting informal practices among these players, see generally
RoY B. FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE (1992); PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR OF
JUSTICE (1988).
23 For data on variations in city-level crime rates, see the compilation of FBI and U.S. Census
Bureau data at CityMayors.com, which ranks cities by rates of reported violent crimes. See Virginia
Beach Named the Safest Big US City, CITY MAYORS, June 9, 2004, available at
http://www.citymayors.com/society/uscitiessafest.html (using 2004 data and reporting, for example,
Fort Worth's violent crime rate per 100,000 citizens at 712 compared to Dallas' rate of 1438; lowest
reported violent crime rate in Virginia Beach, Va., at 224/100,000, while the highest reported rate
was Atlanta at 2,065/100,000).
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Ill.
If democratic practices hold much potential for explaining criminal justice
policymaking by prosecutors and other players, they nonetheless seem a
challenging site from which to generate prescriptive ideas for improving criminal
justice. Political structures and patterns of civic life are not easily amenable to
change, and any movement for change in those arenas is unlikely to be driven
primarily by a goal of improving criminal justice administration. While some
jurisdictions may have the good fortune to have well-functioning political cultures
that, among other things, allow moderate, thoughtful prosecution practices to
thrive, others do not. With that latter group particularly in mind, I now turn from
systemic or macro-level context explanations to other possibilities for mediating
some of the undesirable incentives and practices that arise from the interaction of
expansive criminal codes and expansive prosecutorial discretion. As nearly all
scholars have concluded, prospects for effective regulation here are slim.24 Below
I provide a brief account of those prospects and suggest a possibility for a doctrinal
change that could play a modest role in checking prosecutorial abuse of one aspect
of overcriminalization.
Clearly prosecutors in many jurisdictions retain the leeway-and sometimes
the incentive-to charge and bargain harshly in ways that exploit overexpansive
criminal codes and sentencing laws. The overcriminalization that prosecutors
sometimes exploit takes three forms. The least significant is probably
criminalization of conduct that few people think is morally wrong, or for which
there is no persuasive argument of blameworthiness. Such statutes exist; adult
consensual sex crimes probably fit this category,25 as do the notorious federal
misdemeanors of misusing Smokey Bear's image or disturbing mud in a federal
cave. 26 But these crimes are largely or completely unenforced, and the political
incentives on prosecutors will keep them that way. The American political system
is fairly good at prompting legislative repeal of crimes that no longer have wide
popular support but significantly interfere with people's personal, social and
commercial lives. Look at our history of repealing everything from nineteenth
century commercial crimes against wholesalers to formerly widespread
prohibitions on gambling, alcohol sales, contraceptive distribution, and
24 See, e.g., Richman & Stuntz, supra note 1. For a partial dissenting view based on recent
developments in two states, see Ronald Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of
Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1010 (2005).
25 For historical accounts of how outdated and sparsely enforced sodomy laws can
nonetheless be employed by local officials to arrest, prosecute or harass gays and lesbians, see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS (2008).
26 16 U.S.C. §§ 4302(1), 4302(5), 4306(a)(1), 4306(b) (2006) (offense to disturb a cave); 18
U.S.C. § 711 (2006) (criminalizing unauthorized use of the "Smokey Bear" name).
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midwifery.27  The political process is hardly perfect at managing
overcriminalization; problematic statutes and enforcement policies remain.
Scholars have offered proposals for addressing remaining strands of
overcriminalization. Doug Husak and Bill Stuntz have both suggested that courts
develop-for the first time in our history-a constitutional law of substantive
criminal law, a doctrine that could overturn criminal statutes not grounded in a
workable application of the harm principle or a theory of moral blameworthiness.
28
I have doubts about the feasibility of such doctrines,29 but no alternative to such
judicial review or the political process for the problem of excessive criminalization
seems on the horizon.
The second, much more problematic aspect of overcriminalization is
excessive punishment attached to uncontroversial (or at least plausible) criminal
statutes. Here the political constraints on prosecutors' (and judges')
implementation are much weaker. Some mandatory sentencing regimes leave
those actors little way to avoid overly harsh sentencing consequences for
legitimate prosecutions; in other cases, prosecutors have the power to invoke or
forgo sentence enhancements (say, under recidivist sentencing statutes) but little
political incentive to do so. 3 1 On the whole, public monitoring and democratic
process seem to work less well at moderating harsh sentencing than at eventually
winning repeal or non-enforcement of outdated statutes. But in addition to
Barker's evidence for the salutary effect of some democratic processes and civic
participation rates, there are nonetheless some countervailing pressures. Some
state sentencing guideline systems, such as Virginia's, work well at monitoring
regimes on trial judges and prosecutors to keep their discretionary sentencing
choices in line with voluntary guideline standards. 32 (Virginia's incarceration rate
is only slightly above the national average.) 33 In Virginia and in other states,
budget pressures can be a significant force in moderating incarceration rates and
27 For a brief account of this history of legislative decriminalization, see Darryl K. Brown,
Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEx. L. REv. 223 (2007).
28 See DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION (2008); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505 (2001).
29 See DARRYL K. BROWN, HISTORY'S CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL LAW THEORY, CRIMINAL LAW
AND PHILOSOPHY (forthcoming 2009).
30 But see id. (suggesting administrative bodies play a greater role in drafting substantive
criminal law).
31 For an example of state law granting prosecutors power to forgo sentence enhancements (and
an unusual state rule requiring such decisions to be made based on written policy), see State v.
Brimage, 706 A.2d 1096 (N.J. 1998). For an example of a state statute giving prosecutors power to
invoke mandatory sentences for repeat offenders, see Fla. Stat. § 775.084 (2008).
32 See King & Noble, supra note 2 1.
33 See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998, tbl
5.4, supra note 10.
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prompting policy movement toward alternatives to prison.3 And Ron Wright has
identified nascent examples in a couple of states that hold potential as models for
state sentencing commissions prompting development of prosecutorial guidelines
that could have a significant moderating effect.35  Judicial intervention as an
alternative to these political mechanisms seems at least as unlikely as it is with
respect to expansive substantive rules. The Supreme Court has been active in
recent years in revising sentencing practices, but it has largely shut down the
prospect of any meaningful proportionality review that could put an outer limit on
incarceration sentences.
The final form of overcriminalization takes the form of redundant
criminalization-statutes that prohibit conduct that is already criminalized, or
largely so, by other statutes. Redundant and overlapping criminalization poses a
considerable risk for prosecutorial misuse in a relatively low-visibility manner that
is hard to monitor. Prosecutors can stack charges that drive defendants into hard
bargains; even when charges are ultimately dropped, they have done their work as
bargaining chips. Some prosecutorial charging guidelines formally discourage this
tactic, though none are enforceable by actors outside the prosecutor's office.36
Even if courts were to surprise us and develop constitutional supervision of
criminal law's content, much of this form of overcriminalization would not be
affected because most such statutes criminalize conduct that is uncontroversial in
its wrongfulness.
The common law has long had a weak doctrine for dealing with a small
portion of prosecutorial overreaching through overlapping statutes. The merger
doctrine, with some variation among jurisdictions, generally holds that lesser
included offenses merge into greater offenses for purposes of punishment. Some
jurisdictions more broadly apply the doctrine than others, especially in felony
murder contexts to prohibit punishment on a greater range of underlying felonies.
But many states have followed Virginia's pattern of narrowly construing the
doctrine to do very little work. The same is true for the somewhat related doctrine
in some states (such as Virginia) 37 that have statutory or constitutional rules for a
"same episode" approach to double jeopardy doctrine. The Model Penal Code's
34 See Barker, supra note 12; Christopher Swope, Revising Sentences, in GOVERNING ISSUES
AND APPLICATIONS FROM THE FRONT LINEs OF GOVERNMENT 93 (Alan Ehrenhalt, ed. 2005); ROBIN
CAMPBELL, VERA INST., DOLLARS AND SENTENCES: LEGISLATORS' VIEWS ON PRISONS, PUNISHMENT
AND THE BUDGET CRISIS (2003).
35 Ronald Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010 (2005).
36 See id. at 1024, nn.57 & 58 (Washington state's statutory prosecutorial guidelines codify a
no-overcharging rule but forbid judicial enforcement).
37 A Virginia statute provides that "[i]f the same act be a violation of two or more statutes ....
conviction under one of such statutes... shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other
or others." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (2008). Virginia courts have repeatedly construed this
provision as narrowly as possible, so that bars only successive prosecutions initiated after a
conviction and thus works as only as a narrow joinder rule.
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relevant provision, section 1.07,38 is similarly limited and-relying on the
"included offense" concept-states only that a defendant may not be convicted of
more than one offense arising from "the same conduct" if "one offense is included
in the other." All of these approaches have had limited effectiveness and have "not
proven useful or clear as a guide to determining when multiple liability is
appropriate. 39
Despite courts' traditional approach to narrow construction of these doctrines
and statutory formulations, the expansion of both the merger and same-conduct
double jeopardy doctrines could be a plausible avenue for judicial supervision of
charging practices that exploit closely overlapping statutes. To be sure, this form
of review would be more intrusive than most courts have engaged in through these
doctrines. It would require courts not merely to examine whether two charges
share elements, or whether the prosecution is using the same facts to prove each
statute's elements (familiar analyses in double jeopardy doctrine), but whether the
statutes serve the same functional purpose or protect against the same harm and
public interest, such that punishment under both for a single act constitutes double
punishment. Under merger doctrine, courts engage in this sort of interest or
statutory purpose scrutiny, but generally very differentially. And under same-
conduct double jeopardy doctrine, several state courts are experienced in close
factual inquiry into the facts prosecutors use to prove charges under different
statutes.4°
A statutory provision requiring courts to engage in this sort of analysis was
proposed in code revision projects in Illinois and Kentucky. (Paul Robinson and
Michael Cahill were key players in drafting those reform proposals.) That
provision would bar conviction for offenses "based on the same conduct" if "the
harm or wrong of one offense is... [inter alia] entirely accounted for by the other
offense. 41  Rather than limiting courts to a comparison of specific elements
between charged offenses, this approach focuses courts' attention on the gravamen
of each offense.
The great expansion of criminal codes in the last several decades along with
the now-established ubiquity of plea bargaining practice that is largely unregulated
by sources other than prosecutors themselves, suggests a justification for
expanding courts' longstanding role in limiting multiple liability and punishment
38 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (1985).
39 Michael T. Cahill, Offense Grading and Multiple Liability: New Challenges for a Model
Penal Code Second, 1 OIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 599, 605 (2004) (criticizing M.P.C. § 1.07).
4o The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the same-conduct test under the Fifth Amendment
Double Jeopardy Clause, after a three-year experiment, in United States. v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688
(1993), but several states continue to use the doctrine as a matter of constitutional or statutory law.
41 PROPOSED ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE REwRITE & REFORM COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF
THE ILLINOIS CRIMtNAL CODE REWRITE & REFORM COMMISSION § 254(l)(a) (2003); see also CRIM.
JUST. COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY PENAL CODE REVISION PROJECT OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE COUNCIL § 502.254(1)(a) (2003), available at
http:llwww.law.upenn.edulfac/phrobinslkentucky/.
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beyond the traditional confines of included-offense analysis. Merger doctrine
arose in the common law at a time when codes were small and contained few
overlapping or redundant statutes. Merger doctrine, in effect, governed most cases
of overlapping crimes, and thereby prevented most cases of double punishment
brought on by charge stacking. Judicial supervision of prosecutorial charging, on
this picture, was fairly thorough. Judges were an effective check on prosecutor's
attempts at overreaching. As codes expanded and overlap increased, however,
merger doctrine did not. The doctrine's reinvigoration for the present state of
criminal law could provide an effective mechanism for such supervision, with a
doctrinal pedigree more familiar historically than the one scholars hope for in the
form of constitutional supervision of criminal law's substantive content. Note that
such a doctrine would regulate prosecutors even before the stage of formal
charging, because both parties should be able to recognize the emptiness of threats
to charge overlapping crimes that would be blocked by a broad merger rule.
Such a strategy would be a partial solution, to be sure. A doctrine would have
to be rigorous enough to check familiar sorts of overlapping charges not covered
by current merger doctrine-say, armed robbery, use of a gun in a felony, and
possession of a gun by a convicted felon.42 And, as noted above, this strategy gets
at only one piece of the puzzle-it doesn't address the substantial power
prosecutors derive in bargaining from excessive sentencing provisions-what we
can call the Bordenkircher problem.43 But such a doctrinal development could be
more piece in the evolution of criminal justice systems to help restore some
balance.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prosecutors, like legislators, are somewhat susceptible to an arms race
dynamic of jurisdictional competition that can increase punishment severity, the
scope of substantive law, and enforcement priorities. But those competitive
incentives seem to explain only a limited set of crimes and practices in criminal
justice, especially those targeted to mobile repeat offenders. Interestingly, vibrant
participatory democracy, with citizens involved in civic as well as political life,
seems a likely candidate for being a stronger influence-and moderating
influence-on criminal justice practice and policy. Citizens and policymakers
have many options, inside and outside criminal justice, for addressing crime and
public safety, and strong democratic institutions may play a bigger role shaping
those choices than competitive pressures to maximize criminal law's mechanisms
of deterrence and incapacitation. But many American jurisdictions lack such
institutionalized democratic practices, and it is unclear in any case how much those
42 See Morris v. Commonwealth, 609 S.E.2d 92 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
43 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); see also William J. Stuntz,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE SToRIEs 351 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
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practices shape prosecutorial policies in particular, especially plea bargaining. We
have seen the gradual growth of modest regulation of prosecutorial practices,
mostly by prosecutors themselves, although sometimes in response to public
scrutiny or courts' prompting. Nonetheless, a larger role for the judiciary in this
supervisory project would be welcome, and some regulation of overlapping crimes
and charge stacking through an expanded merger doctrine is one additional option
courts could develop in that new role.
